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GARY DeLAND, Director, Department :
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:
Defendant/Appellee.
:

Priority No. 3

PETITION FOR REHEARING

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a Petition for Rehearing on an appeal from a
dismissal of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third
Judicial District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON REHEARING
1.

Whether this Court should grant rehearing to

consider requiring a criminal appellant to seek a remand for an
evidentiary hearing prior to briefing on appeal if he desires to
raise an ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim based upon
matters outside the trial record?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner was charged with aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978).
After a jury trial, petitioner was found guilty on June 6, 1985

in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings,
presiding.
Petitioner appealed his conviction of aggravated
robbery to the this Court.

This Court affirmed petitioner's

conviction in State v. Jensen, 727 P.2d 201 (Utah 1986).
Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County.

After a hearing on January 23, 1987, Judge Richard H.

Moffat dismissed the petition as procedurally barred.
On appeal from the dismissal, this Court remanded the
habeas corpus matter to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing on petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.
1989).

Jensen v. DeLand, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah Dec. 29,
(Addendum "A"; Slip Opinion.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts are set forth in the Brief of

Respondent.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should grant rehearing to fully consider
whether a criminal defendant should be required to raise an
ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim on direct appeal by means
of seeking a remand for an evidentiary hearing on matters outside
the trial record.

Additionally, this Court's opinion in Hafen v.

Morris should be reaffirmed, distinguished, or overruled.
Finally, the language requiring that an issue be voluntarily
waived to establish procedural default should be modified as
consistent with other case law.
-?-

ARGUMENT
A CRIMINAL APPELLANT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO
RAISE AN INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL CLAIM ON
DIRECT APPEAL IF HE COULD HAVE SOUGHT A
REMAND FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING REGARDING
MATTERS NOT CONTAINED IN THE TRIAL RECORD.
This appeal raises the perpetual conflict arising in
postconviction relief actions; judicial economy v. access to the
courts.

See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1032-33 (Utah 1989).

Rule 65B(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is designed to
allow convicted criminals limited access to the courts when
justice requires.

Undoubtedly, prison inmates often take

advantage of this limited right.

For this reason, this Court has

established procedural rules which require a showing of "unusual
circumstances" for failure to timely raise a claim in the regular
appellate process.

When a claim could and should have been

raised on direct appeal but was not, the claim is deemed waived
or procedurally barred.

Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104-

05 (Utah 1983) .
A dilemma arises when it is procedurally questionable
whether a petitioner could have raised an issue on direct appeal.
The State petitions for rehearing to offer a just and pragmatic
solution to the problem arising when a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal due
to the absence of an opportunity to create an appealable record
on the issue.
Typically, as in the present case, an appellate counsel
may forego raising an ineffectiveness claim for the reason that
there is no record support due to the nature of the claim, e.g.,

_7-

failure to conduct pretrial investigations, failure to conduct
discovery, lack of preparation at trial, failure to subpoena
defense witnesses or failure to advise a petitioner of his
rights.

(See Br. of Resp. at 5).

At present, there is no

statute or rule which effectively allows a criminal appellant to
supplement the trial record with extrajudicial evidence of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel. A motion for new trial permits
a postconviction evidentiary hearing, but must be filed within
ten (10) days of the judgment and sentence.
24.

Utah R. Crim. P.

In most cases, it is unlikely that new counsel on appeal

will have the opportunity to review the trial record for
ineffectiveness and timely file a motion for new trial on those
grounds.

But see State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App.

1989) .
The proposed solution is to procedurally allow a
criminal appellant a limited opportunity to a remand for an
evidentiary hearing on matters of "fundamental unfairness" which
2
by their nature are not contained on the record.

The benefit of

such a procedure is to forward the general policy favoring the
finality of judgments.

A criminal appellant would thus be

procedurally required to raise on direct appeal a claim of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel, unless he is also represented
by trial counsel on appeal.

<C£. Fernandez v. Cook, 121 Utah Adv.

Another possible remedy would be to modify the new trial rule
to extend the time for filing a motion for new trial when an
ineffectiveness claim is presented by new counsel.
o
This remedy was applied by this Court in State v. Jones, 734
P.2d 4 73 (Utah 1987) (remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of prosecutorial misconduct).
-4-

Rep. 13, 14 (Utah Nov. 16, 1989).

This procedure would also

avoid the use of postconviction relief as a secondary appellate
process which effectively puts the original trial on trial. In
theory, this would avoid unnecessary duplication of the judicial
process.
As this Court stated in its opinion, a criminal
defendant should not be permitted to "strategically abstain from
raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim which could be
reviewed on direct appeal."

Jensen v. DeLand, No. 870107, slip

op. at 5 (Utah Dec. 29, 1989).

Realistically, such "stop gap"

language is unenforceable without a means of detecting when an
ineffectiveness claim has been strategically withheld on appeal.
By providing an opportunity for an appellant to timely raise and
support an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, a defendant
would be procedurally barred from utilizing postconviction relief
as a substitute for direct appeal.
This proposed solution is novel and not without
frailties.

The State does not here attempt to analyze all the

possible consequences.

Suffice it to say that unless the

proposed opportunity for a remand is properly tailored, the
solution may become worse than the problem it seeks to solve.
For this reason, a petition for rehearing is necessary to permit
a full discussion of this alternative remedy.
A further concern of the State is this Court's quiet
disregard of the case of Hafen v. Morris, 632 P.2d 875 (Utah
1981), cited by the State in its Supplemental Brief.

The Hafen

case was cited for the proposition that the silence of a

defendant waives the right to raise an issue known to defendant
at trial and on appeal.

Id., at 876.

In Hafen, the defendant had

requested his trial attorney to challenge a juror who the
defendant knew.

lei. The defendant also claimed that he

requested his trial attorney to raise the issue on appeal.

Id.

On appeal from a postconviction action, this Court held that the
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was properly
dismissed due to the defendant's silence at trial and on appeal.
Id.
The holding in Hafen is contrary to this Court's
opinion in the present case.

Here, defendant knew of the

ineffectiveness issues and requested his appellate counsel to
raise them on appeal. As in Hafen, defendant's appellate counsel
did not honor his request.
Hafen.

Defendant remained silent as did

No "unusual circumstances" exist in the present case

beyond those found insufficient in Hafen to preclude application
of the procedural waiver rule.
The State requests this Court to acknowledge the Hafen
case and reaffirm it, distinguish it, or overrule it.

If this

Court's opinion in the present case is permitted to stand as
written, trial courts will be faced with inconsistent precedents
regarding the doctrine of procedural waiver.
Finally, the State is concerned with the broad language
in the opinion which presumptively permits a habeas petitioner to
raise an ineffective assistance claim unless "voluntarily
waived."

A requirement that an issue be voluntarily waived is

inconsistent with the general rule of procedural waiver.

-6-

The

well-settled inquiry in a postconviction case is whether an issue
could and should have been procedurally raised on direct appeal.
It should not be necessary for the State to affirmatively
establish that a defendant was aware of an issue and that he
voluntarily waived it.

If this were so, a criminal defendant

would never be barred from raising new issues after a direct
appeal absent a finding of voluntary waiver similar to the
findings required in entering a guilty plea.
R. Crim. P.

See Rule 11, Utah

The State does not believe this Court intended such

a requirement and requests that the language in the opinion be
modified to avoid confusion or misinterpretation.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to grant a rehearing to more fully consider the issues.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^>——day

of February,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to Craig Cook, Attorney for Appellant, 3645 East 3100
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This opinion is subject to revision
before
publication
in the Pacific
Reporter.
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HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Richard L. Jensen appeals from the
dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(i).
Plaintiff was convicted of aggravated robbery, a
first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978)
(amended 1989). He appealed to this Court, contending that
there had been a violation of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) at
his trial through the admission of evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts contained in letters written by him. We
affirmed his conviction in State v. Jensen, 727 P.2d 201
(Utah 1986).
Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, alleging three central errors: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel at trial;1 (2) prosecutorial
misconduct; and (3) court error. Defendant moved to dismiss
his petition, which motion was granted by the trial court for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff appeals, contending that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
65B(i)(2) and (8).
1. Plaintiff was represented by different attorneys at trial
and on appeal.

I
At the threshold, we are confronted with the question
whether plaintiff has waived his claims of error as to
prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error. Specifically,
he complains that the prosecutor (1) took an illegal
deposition of plaintiff's alibi witness, (2) held a pretrial
showing of evidence to witnesses, (3) obtained letters from
plaintiff's alibi witness at an illegal deposition,
(4) entered evidence without a proper showing of chain of
custody, (5) objected to the introduction of evidence
favorable to plaintiff, i.e., the rap sheet of a person other
than plaintiff with the same name, (6) offered evidence to
rebut prior identification of plaintiff, and (7) failed to
give notice to plaintiff of the intent to call Terry Harris as
a prosecution witness. As for court error, plaintiff asserts
that the trial judge (1) allowed an improper offer of evidence
by the prosecution (mugshot and hat), (2) allowed the taking
and admission of an illegal deposition, (3) failed to instruct
the jury as to the purpose of letters admitted into evidence,
and (4) sentenced plaintiff to an enhanced term without filing
a complaint or otherwise giving notice.
All of these claims of misconduct and error could
have been raised on plaintiff's direct appeal. State v.
Jensen, 727 P.2d 201 (Utah 1986). We have repeatedly held
that postconviction relief cannot be used to circumvent the
regular appellate process. Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d 832,
833-34 (Utah 1988); State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 898 n.4 (Utah
1988) (Hall, C.J., dissenting); Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803,
804 (Utah 1988); Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah
1987) (per curiam); Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 787, 788 (Utah
1986); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104-05 (Utah 1983);
Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 1981); Brown v.
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968). In
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1104, we stated that
allegations of error occurring at trial must be raised on
appeal or they are waived unless unusual circumstances exist:
It is therefore well settled in this state
that allegations of error that could have
been but were not raised on appeal from a
criminal conviction cannot be raised by
habeas corpus or postconviction review,
except in unusual circumstances.
In Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d at 98-99, 440 P.2d at 969, we
explained:
[Habeas corpus] is an extraordinary
remedy which is properly invocable only
when the court had no jurisdiction over
the person or the offense, or where the
No. 870107
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requirements of law have been so
disregarded that the party is
substantially and effectively denied due
process of law, or where some such fact is
shown that it would be unconscionable not
to re-examine the conviction. If the
contention of error is something which is
known or should be known to the party at
the time the judgment was entered, it must
be reviewed in the manner and within the
time permitted by regular prescribed
procedure, or the judgment becomes final
and is not subject to further attack,
except in some such unusual circumstance
as we have mentioned above. Were it
otherwise, the regular rules of procedure
governing appeals and the limitations of
time specified therein would be rendered
impotent.
(Emphasis added, footnote omitted.) Since plaintiff's
complaints of prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error
were known to him and his appellate counsel and could have
been raised on his appeal to this Court but were not, they
have been waived. No unusual circumstances have been pointed
out to escape that result.
II
Plaintiff has explained his failure to raise on
appeal his complaint of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. In an unsworn written statement drafted by
plaintiff and interlineated and signed by his appellate
counsel, counsel states that he advised plaintiff not to
raise the ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim on direct appeal.
The statement reflects that plaintiff and his attorney
understood the risk that waiver might be raised later. The
statement reads:
I, Earl Xiaz, the Attorney in the above
Affidavit state: That I realize that my
Client may not use the remedy of a Habeas
Corpus as a substitute for a Direct
Appeal. That a petitioner cannot raise
issues in a Habeas proceeding that could
or should have been raised on Direct
Appeal.
My Client has had the desire to raise
other issues like Ineffectiveness of
Counsel, but I have discouraged him from
going in that direction because there is
nothing in the record to support the
3
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claim. Thus, an evidentiary hearing is
required in which trial counsel should be
called as a witness. They do not fit the
rules for Direct Appeal points.
My Client under my direction had left
this point out because I have advised him
to. If at a later date there arises a
controversy from another court, I take
full responsibility for my Clients'
failure to bring up this point.
I will be available at any time to
answer any questions as to my judgements
in Richard L. Jensen's Supreme Court
Appeal or any other remedy.
Furthermore, during the hearing on the State's motion to
dismiss plaintiff's petition, plaintiff explained that he had
attempted to raise the issue on direct appeal, but his
counsel refused. Plaintiff characterizes his counsel's
refusal as an "unusual circumstance."
In the recent case of Fernandez v. Cook,
P.2d
,
, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 14 (November 16, 1989), this Court
held that because the defendant's trial attorney represented
him on his first appeal, it was unreasonable to expect that
attorney to raise the issue of his own ineffectiveness at
trial on direct appeal. Such unusual circumstances made the
defendant's habeas corpus petition his first and only means to
raise the ineffectiveness issue. Id. at 14. We held that the
district court erred in dismissing his petition without a
hearing on the merits. Id.
In the instant case, the written statement clearly
shows that the claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel was
deleted from plaintiff's direct appeal solely because of the
advice of his appellate counsel that the claim could not
properly be raised then. Under these circumstances, there was
no waiver by plaintiff of that claim. In a somewhat similar
situation, in Palmer v. Dermitt, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (Idaho
1981), the plaintiff in a petition for post-conviction relief
failed to raise issues of perjured testimony, manufactured
evidence, and ineffective assistance of his prior
post-conviction counsel due to the deletion of those issues
from the plaintiff's original pro se petition by his
court-appointed attorney without the knowledge or consent of
the plaintiff. The Idaho court held that the omission of
those issues was not an active, voluntary choice by the
plaintiff.
We conclude that plaintiff has not voluntarily waived
his right to raise the ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim in his
petition. An evidentiary hearing is appropriate here in light
No. 870107

4

of appellate counsel's clear advice at the time the appeal
was taken that the issue could not appropriately be raised on
appeal. Although the State argues that plaintiff has failed
to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude, we pointed out
in Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988), that if
counsel's deficiencies were sufficiently grievous to deprive
the plaintiff of effective assistance of counsel, they
constitute a violation of due process that is clearly
reviewable by habeas corpus review. See also Fernandez v.
Cook,
P.2d at
, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14; Martinez v.
Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979). By our decision today,
we do not suggest or imply that a criminal defendant may
strategically abstain from raising an ineffective-assistance
of-counsel claim which could be reviewed on direct appeal.
We do not and will not sanction manipulation of that sort.
It is impossible for us now to adequately review
plaintiff's sixteen claims of ineffectiveness without an
adequate record. See Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109
(Utah 1983); see also Johnson v. Morris, 645 P.2d 51, 52
(Utah 1982) (per curiam). We therefore remand to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue
alone, applying the test outlined in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-92, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066-67,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695-96, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S.
Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984), and Bundy v. DeLand, 763
P.2d at 805.

WE CONCUR:

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice

Hall, Chief Justice, and Stewart, Justice, concur in
the result.
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